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Responsibility for Implicit Bias
Philosophers  who  have  written  about  implicit  bias  have  claimed  or  implied  that  individuals  are  not 
responsible, and therefore not blameworthy, for their  implicit  biases, and that this  is a function of the 
nature  of  implicit  bias  as  implicit:  below  the  radar  of  conscious  reflection,  out  of  the  control  of  the 
deliberating agent, and not rationally revisable in the way many of our reflective beliefs are. 1
On this  way of  thinking about bias and responsibility  individuals  may be responsible for responding to 
information that they are, most likely, beset by implicit biases; they may be blameworthy if they fail to put 
in place strategies for preventing their biases from having an effect on decisions (such as anonymising CVs 
or essays).  In other words, individuals may be blameworthy for failing to take responsibility for implicit 
biases once they are aware that they are likely to be influenced by them; but otherwise, individuals are not 
blameworthy for being biased, or for being influenced by implicit bias.
I  argue  that  close  attention  to  the  findings  of  empirical  psychology,  and  to  the  conditions  for 
blameworthiness, does not support these claims. I suggest that the arguments for the claim that individuals 
are not liable for blame are invalid, and that there is some reason to suppose that individuals are, at least 
sometimes, liable to blame for the extent to which they are influenced in behaviour and judgment by 
implicit biases. I also argue against the claim that it is counter-productive to see bias as something for which 
individuals are blameworthy; rather, understanding implicit bias as something for which we are (sometimes) 
liable to blame could be constructive.
In  section  1,  I  set  up  what  is  meant  by  implicit  bias,  and  the  concerns  that  some philosophers  have 
expressed  about  treating  persons  as  liable  to  blame  for  their  implicit  biases.  In  2,  I  consider  these 
arguments  in  detail,  giving  consideration  to  empirical  studies  and  to  the  necessary  conditions  for 
responsibility posited. In doing so, we gain a clearer view on some of the kinds of factors that can influence 
the extent to which bias is manifested. Having concluded that we should reject the arguments canvassed for 
the conclusion that we are not liable to blame for biases, in section 3 I then go on to consider, and respond 
to, the concern that blaming individuals for implicit biases can be counter-productive.
1. Implicit bias: pervasive and blameless?
What is  meant  by  'implicit  bias'?  Let  us  start  with  a  working  definition  that  draws on the findings  of 
empirical psychologists' studies over the last two decades. 
An  individual  harbours  an  implicit  bias  against  some  stigmatised  group  (G),  when  she  has  automatic 
cognitive  or  affective  associations  between  (her  concept  of)  G  and  some  negative  property  (P)  or 
stereotypic trait (T), which are accessible and can be operative in influencing judgement and behaviour 
without the conscious awareness of the agent.2 
1 Brief discussion of responsibility, accountability and exculpation can be found in Machery, Faucher & Kelly, ‘On the 
Alleged Inadequacy of Psychological Explanations of Racism’, The Monist, 93(2), pp.228-255 (see esp. pp.246-249). 
See also Susanne Pohlman, (ms.) 'Accountability and Underpinning Attitudes of Biased Beliefs'. However, Pohlman 
focuses rather on the extent to which individuals are accountable for implicit bias, which she argues comes apart 
from responsibility in the sense of liability for blame.
2 Three points to note: i) whilst I am aware of disagreements between psychologists as to how best to capture the 
phenomena of implicit attitudes or bias (e.g. Fazio et al's MODE model, versus Dovidio et al's 'dual attitudes' 
approach), I think this characterisation is neutral between the these different understandings; ii) some people think 
that the IAT tracks in-group/out-group associations, rather than more stable associations between members of 
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There are three noteworthy features of this understanding of implicit bias. First, the implicit part of the bias 
pertains  to  the association,  rather  than to  concepts  implicitly  held  or  to  any  implicit  belief-like  states. 
(Psychologists  often  refer  to  implicit  associations  as  'implicit  attitudes'.)  For  example,  an  agent  could 
explicitly entertain non-prejudiced thoughts about a member of a stigmatised group whilst unconsciously 
making cognitive associations with negative evaluations or stereotypic  traits; she might then be described 
as having implicit negative attitudes or biases (I’m here using these terms interchangeably). Secondly, there 
are two parts  to this  understanding:  the implicit  associations (having  the bias);  and their  influence on 
behaviour or judgement (manifesting  the bias). This distinction corresponds to that made in some of the 
empirical literature between stereotype activation (the presence of accessible associations) and application 
(the use or  influence of  those in decision making and action).3 It  will  be important when we come to 
consider for what individuals might be liable to blame. Finally, the associations in question are automatic, 
occurring without the instigation of the process being consciously directed or undertaken, and not directly 
subject to rational revision in the way our explicit beliefs are.4
How do we know that an individual harbours certain biases, for example, about black people and about 
women? This isn't something known by introspection, reflection, or self-report on one's motives: else the 
empirical data on implicit bias would not be surprising (or perhaps needed). But the presence and influence 
of such biases in the cognitive structures of individuals has shown up in a number of studies over the past 
two decades. One of the most well known and widely written about studies is the Implicit Association Test: 
a test undertaken on a computer which monitors the time it takes for the subject to pair up terms (e.g. 
positive or negative) and faces (e.g. black or white) or names (e.g. which sound stereotypically black or 
white). The pairing tasks are to be executed very quickly (in mere milliseconds), so as not to allow time for 
conscious reflection to guide responses. For many individuals, the time taken to pair up black faces with 
positive terms is greater than that for black faces and negative terms, or for white faces and positive terms 
(mutatis mutandis for black or white sounding names).5 So for an individual who is slower to pair up black 
faces or words and positive terms (than pairing up white and positive terms), and faster to pair up black 
faces and words and negative terms (that white and negative terms), it is concluded that she has more 
accessible,  and  therefore  other  things  being  equal  stronger,  associations  between  black  people  and 
negative evaluations. 
Another test is the 'evaluative priming measure', which primes individuals with some concept, and then 
measures how quickly or slowly they are able to recognise and categorise positive or negative terms. The 
idea is that if the individual has negative associations with the prime (e.g. a black face), she will be faster to 
categorise the negative terms or items as bad than the positive ones as good (because negative items will 
stigmatised groups and negative or stereotypic traits. But there's reason to suppose at least some cases of biases 
are concerned with stigmatised, rather than just out-groups (because members of the stigmatised group 
themselves harbour biases); iii) by 'accessible' I do not mean 'accessible to introspection'. Rather accessibility is 
understood in terms of the speed and ease of associations made. For discussion of disagreement over precisely 
how we should understand 'association', see Greenwald, A, Nosek, B, Banaji M., Klauer, K (2005) Validity of the 
Salience asymmetry interpretation of the IAT: Comment on Rothermund and Wentura (2004) Journal of  
Experimental Psychology: General 134: 420-425.
3  See Gilbert & Hixon, 1991. The trouble of thinking: Activation and application of stereotypic beliefs. Journal of  
Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 509–517.
4 Because the implicit biases appear to be best understood as kinds of accessible cognitive association, it is 
inappropriate to think of them as analogues of explicit belief; they will not have propositional content, for example.
5 Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson & Johnson, (1997) On the nature of prejudice: Automatic and controlled processes 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 33, 510-540; Nosek, B. A., A. G. Greenwald, and M. R. Banaji. (2007) ‘The 
Implicit Association Test at Age 7: A Methodological and Conceptual Review’ Automatic Processes in Social  
Thinking and Behavior. Ed. J. A. Bargh. Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press.
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have been made accessible by the black face prime).6 Importantly, individuals who show such implicit biases 
often explicitly endorse non-biased, non-racist beliefs – although in one respect this is unsurprising, given 
the  widespread  norm  that  prejudiced  expressions  are  unacceptable.7 Thus  these  tests  use  implicit 
measures, to detect implicit biases of which the individual may not be aware, rather than asking individuals 
to simply report on their attitudes.
One might think that such experiments reveal associations that, discerned in the lab, are unlikely to play 
much role in the real world. But a range of studies suggest that various implicit negative associations, held 
by people who may disavow explicit racism, have an effect on judgement and behaviour outside the lab: the 
greater readiness to identify an indeterminate object in the hands of a black (rather than white) male as a 
gun; the less positive evaluation of the same CV when it they bears a woman's name rather than a man's; 
the differential hiring recommendations (more positive for the white applicants) made for black and white 
candidates when their qualifications were equally moderately good, but not wholly decisive.8 Such studies 
are regarded as evidence that negative associations about stigmatised groups can be more specific than 
those identified in some IAT tests, concerning quite particular stereotypical and negative associations, and 
can influence judgement and behaviour 'in the field', beyond response times in IATs conducted in the lab.
1.1 Are we liable for blame for these implicit biases?
Many published  studies  have  supported  the  hypothesis  that  individuals’  behaviours  are  influenced  by 
implicit biases.9 This is cause for significant concern, not least if such biases are part of the explanation for 
patterns  of  subtle  differential  treatment,  with  effects  such  as  the  continuing  under-representation  of 
women and minority groups in a range of professions and educational environments.10 Is it also cause for 
blame? Are individuals responsible and liable to blame for the implicit biases that they have? This question 
is important, as our answer to it has implications for how we might treat others and regard ourselves, for 
being influenced by these biases. Should we feel guilty for manifesting implicit biases? Should we expect 
others to do so? Is it reasonable to challenge and blame each other if implicit biases are manifested?
A  number  of  philosophers  have  touched  upon  this  question.11 In  her  influential  paper  'Unconscious 
Influences and Women in Philosophy,' Saul writes that we should not regard people as responsible for their 
biases:
I think it is also important to abandon the view that all biases against stigmatised groups are 
blameworthy.  My first reason for abandoning this view is its falsehood.  A person should not 
be blamed for an implicit bias that they are completely unaware of, which results solely from 
6 See Petty, Fazio, Brinol 2009, pp.1-9 for an overview of the IAT and evaluative priming measures.  Petty, R. H. Fazio, 
& P. Briñol (Eds.), Attitudes: Insights from the new implicit measures (pp. 3-18).  New York, NY:  Psychology Press. 
Fazio also notes that the term 'implicit' is sometimes used to refer to the measure as well as or rather than 
the attitude (what I have here referred to as the cognitive associations).
7  Dovidio, J. F., & Gaertner, S. L. (2004). Aversive racism. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social  
psychology (pp. 1 – 52). San Diego, CA: Academic Press; Pearson, Dovidio & Gaertner, (2009) The Nature of 
Contemporary Prejudice: Insights from Aversive Racism Social and Personality Psychology Compass 3, pp.314-338.
8  Payne, B. K. (2005) Conceptualizing Control in Social Cognition: The Role of Automatic and Controlled Processes in 
Misperceiving a Weapon. Journal of Personality Social Psychology 81: 181–92; Dovidio, J. F., & Gaertner, S. L. 
(2000).  Aversive racism and selection decisions: 1989 and 1999. Psychological Science, 11, 319-323; Valian, V, 1999 
Why So Slow? The Advancement of Women MIT Press.
9  For an excellent overview, see also Jost et al 2009.
10 See Anderson (2011) The Imperative of Integration for discussion of the problematic effects of under-
representation and (de facto) segregation. 
11  See footnote 1 for other authors who have started to address this question.
3
Jules.Holroyd@nottingham.ac.uk
the fact that they live in a sexist culture.  Even once they become aware that they are likely 
to have implicit biases, they do not instantly become able to control their biases, and so they 
should not be blamed for them. 12
On this line of thought, it is simply a mistake to suppose that individuals are blameworthy for biases they 
harbour, insofar as their biases have the three characteristics, which plausibly exempt from blame, above. 
We can say that biases are problematic, and can encourage people to take steps to get rid of, or mitigate the 
influences  their  biases  might  exert  on  behaviour  or  judgement  -  but  we  shouldn't  hold  people  to  be 
blameworthy  for  the  implicit  associations  or  biases  they  are  influenced  by,  insofar  as  the  relevant 
awareness, control and causal etiology conditions are not met. 
Scepticism about the extent to which individuals are responsible for implicit bias is also expressed in Kelly & 
Roedders'  rich  and highly  suggestive  exploration of  the  ethical  implications  of  empirical  findings  about 
implicit bias.13 They write that:
Particularly in the case of implicit attitudes, it is salient that their acquisition may be rapid, 
automatic, and uncontrollable. These features, it might be thought, are related to features 
that establish blameworthiness – such as identification (Frankfurt) or reasons-responsiveness 
(Fischer and Ravizza). For instance, it might be said that the implicitly racist person doesn’t 
identify with his implicit attitude, or that the attitude isn’t responsive to reasons; thus we 
cannot hold a person fully accountable for those implicit attitudes. If this is right, one might 
say that such attitudes are morally wrong – and condemnable – but that the person himself 
cannot be blamed for having them (2008, p.532).
The thought here is that implicit  biases might be such that they do not meet the conditions for moral 
responsibility. It is worth noting that Kelly and Roedder are tentative about this thought, acknowledging 
that  whether  the  conditions  for  responsibility  are  met  with  respect  to  implicit  bias  will  depend upon 
empirical findings about the nature of implicit biases:
We are reluctant to embrace this solution wholeheartedly – it may turn out, for instance, that 
narrow-mindedness partially explains the acquisition of implicit racism (ibid).
I  will  suggest  that  the  empirical  findings do indeed suggest  that  there  may sometimes be grounds for 
holding individuals liable to blame for their implicit biases. But what, precisely, might individuals be liable to 
blame for?
1.2. Responsibility for what?
It is worth distinguishing between three different things for which one might be liable to blame:
1. Having an implicit bias: simply having the cognitive or affective associations between groups and 
traits. 
2.  Being influenced in  behaviour  or judgement by these biases:  manifesting it   in  behaviour  or 
judgement.
3. Responding to knowledge that one is (or is likely to be) biased. 
Saul points to the distinction between responsibility for being biased and for responding to the knowledge 
that one is likely to be biased, in her remarks that:
12  Saul, J. Unconscious Influences and Women in Philosophy forthcoming in Women in Philosophy: What Needs to 
Change? Edited by Fiona Jenkins and Katrina Hutchison
13  Kelly, D. & Roedder, E. (2008). Racial Cognition and the Ethics of Implicit Bias, Philosophy Compass, Vol. 3, No. 3: 
522-540.
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[Individuals] may, however, be blamed if they fail to act properly on the knowledge that they 
are likely to be biased— e.g. by investigating and implementing remedies to deal with their 
biases .
It  is  important  to  distinguish  between  the  backward-looking  question  of  whether  individuals  are 
blameworthy for implicit bias, and the forward-looking question of when and how individuals should take 
responsibility for addressing their implicit biases. I am primarily concerned with the former kind of claim, 
about blameworthiness for implicit bias. However, I want also to distinguish between two things for which 
one might be blameworthy:  having some implicit  biases,  and  being influenced by them (as mentioned 
previously,  between the stereotype or  negative  association being  accessible,  and the operation of  this 
stereotype or negative attitude in deliberation and action). This distinction is important for when we come 
to consider the arguments in detail.
In the remarks from Saul and from Kelly and Roedder, above, are considerations that provide the premises 
for five arguments:
a. an argument from the causal etiology of biases, 
b. an argument from control (or lack thereof) with respect to biases, 
c. an argument from lack of awareness, 
d. an argument from lack of reasons-responsiveness, and 
e. an argument from lack of identification.
I'm going to set aside the argument from lack of identification. This is because identification conditions for 
responsibility  -  roughly,  the  conditions  that  an  individual  must  identify  with,  or  endorse  (perhaps 
wholeheartedly) the motives on which she acts - are presented by central proponents as sufficient, rather 
than necessary, for moral responsibility.14 As such, even if an individual does not meet an identification 
condition for responsibility, there may be other conditions with respect to which it is appropriate to regard 
her as responsible (and hence liable to blame, in the absence of excusing conditions). In the next section, I 
consider each of the other arguments in turn.
2. Considering the Arguments Against Responsibility
We can say that an individual is responsible for some action or mental state or process when it reflects on 
her as an agent, in a way that makes it appropriate (absent excusing conditions) to hold her liable to blame 
for it.15 One might claim that having and being influenced by implicit bias is not something that reflects on 
the individual as an agent either because it is a ‘rogue’ element in her cognitive structures (not subject to 
control  or  responsive  to  reasons,  only  there  due  to  cultural  influence),  or  because there  are  excusing 
conditions (she is unaware that bias is operating).
Each reconstructed argument is characterised by a claim about the conditions for responsibility, and an 
empirical claim about the nature of implicit bias. So, in assessing these arguments, we will want to ascertain 
whether  these  empirical  premises  are  true,  and  whether  the  conditions  for  responsibility  are  to  be 
accepted. I'll consider each argument in turn, before drawing preliminary conclusions about the legitimacy 
of treating individuals as liable to blame for biases. 
14 Frankfurt, (1971), Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,  Journal of Philosophy, 68(1), pp.5-20.
15  Clearly this brief remark does not do justice to the wealth of literature on moral responsibility. But this thought is 
one that is shared by those compatibilists who focus on quality of will or rational capacities and incompatibilists 
who focus on control or avoidability alike. My commitments lie with compatibilism, but that makes little difference 
to the discussion here (although hard determinists who deny that individuals are ever morally responsible will not 
accept my starting assumption that individuals are, at least sometimes, morally responsible).
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2.1 Argument from causal etiology.
One of the arguments suggested by Saul's claims is as follows:
1. Individuals cannot be held responsible for cognitive states or processes whose causal 
etiology lies wholly in factors out of their control. 
2. Living in a sexist and racist culture is out of an individual's control.
3. Having implicit biases (against e.g. women, black people) results solely from living in a 
sexist and racist culture.
4. Therefore, individuals cannot be held responsible for their implicit biases.
Note that two different interpretations of premise 3 are possible:
3a. Having implicit bias (i.e. having certain cognitive associations) results solely from living 
in a sexist and racist culture.
3b. Being influenced by implicit biases (i.e. manifesting them in behaviour and judgement) 
results solely from living in a sexist and racist culture.
Thus we might  conclude that individuals  are  not blameworthy for  having biases,  or  negative  cognitive 
associations; or that individuals are not blameworthy for being influenced by these biases in behaviour and 
action.
 
Let's grant the plausible premise 1, which (insofar as it pertains to the persistence, rather than just the 
presence, of a cognitive state) picks out a necessary condition for moral responsibility. More controversial in 
this  argument  is  premise  3  (and its  disambiguations,  3a  and 3b),  according  to  which having,  or  being 
influenced by, implicit biases, results solely from living in a sexist culture.
2.1.1 Variations in implicit biases.
The thought that implicit biases are solely the result of cultural determinants seems to be accompanied by 
two other assumptions, usually tacit. The first assumption is that it is likely that we all have implicit biases.16 
The second is that the extent to which we are implicitly biased is pretty much the same.17 But empirical data 
suggests otherwise. A number of studies have shown that there appears to be considerable variation in the 
degrees of implicit bias that individuals display in experimental tests such as the IAT (Devine 1996)18. Just as 
individuals vary in the extent to which they are explicitly prejudiced, and in the reasons for and extent to 
which they care about not being prejudiced (Plant & Devine, 1998), individuals vary quite significantly in the 
extent to which implicit biases show up in, e.g. their response times to IAT (Devine et al 2002).19 
This variation is not incompatible with the claim that implicit biases result solely from living in cultures that 
are sexist or racist: there are obviously variations in the kinds of experiences and cultural norms we're 
exposed to, so the varying degrees of implicit bias might correspond to how fortunate (or not) we've been 
in to what we’ve been exposed. However, various findings do provide a challenge to the claim that the 
implicit biases are the result solely of the culture we live in: the extent to which we manifest biases may 
rather be a function of other cognitive states we have, and over which we plausibly have control.
16 This thought is at work in Kelly & Roeder, 2008, who consider what to do given that it is likely that we are biased. 
17 There are some exceptions to this: Jolls & Sunstein note that certain bias insulating policies might be problematic 
because they are not sensitive to the different extents to which individuals might be biased. See their (2006) ‘The 
Law of Implicit Bias’ California Law Review, 94, pp.969-996.
18  Devine 1996 Breaking the Prejudice Habit
19  Devine, P., et al. The Regulation of Explicit and Implicit Race Bias: The Role of Motivations to Respond Without 
Prejudice. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 82.5 (2002): 835–48.
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2.1.2 What affects variation in degree of implicit biases?
A point of contention amongst empirical psychologists has been whether implicit measures reveal personal  
attitudes (attitudes of the agent which may be related to an individual's beliefs and evaluative stance); or 
whether the measures are rather reflective of the individual's awareness of social stereotypes (the content 
of which they repudiate). Increasingly, experimental findings have supported the claim that variations in the 
manifestation of  implicit  biases  is  the  result  of  variations  in  personal  attitudes,  rather  than in  general 
knowledge of social perceptions. I detail three relevant findings below. 
1)  Some authors have suggested that there might be variation in the extent to which individuals  have 
implicit  biases.  For  example,  Fazio  et  al  (1995)  write  that  their  studies  on  the  relationship  between 
measures of explicit and implicit attitudes about race imply that:
some individuals do not experience the automatic activation of any negative evaluation ... on 
encountering a Black person . (1025)
Fazio et al identify truly non-prejudiced individuals as  subjects who demonstrated prejudice neither at the 
level of explicit  beliefs,  or implicit  associations. Of course, this does not show that having such explicit 
beliefs influences the extent to which one has implicit biases. Were this the case, then implicit biases would 
appear to result from one's environment and one's explicit beliefs and values. But we could think it just as 
likely that implicit prejudice influences explicit beliefs as that the explicit beliefs affect the implicit prejudice. 
So it would be a mistake to infer, at this stage, that the extent to which one is implicitly biased is likely to be  
influenced by one's explicit  beliefs and values. Were we to make this inference, it  would invalidate the 
argument from causal etiology against responsibility for bias).
2) In her early work on race bias (and contra Fazio's claims above), Devine (1989) argued that individuals are 
likely to hold the same cultural stereotypes - so are likely to have the same implicit associations. In her later 
work, she identified different variables that might influence the extent to which individuals manifest these 
biases in behaviour and action. One important finding concerns the difference in bias manifested between 
individuals who see behaving in a non-prejudiced way as important in itself, and  those who see it as (also) 
important because of social norms prohibiting it, or social sanctions that one might face for so acting (and 
those who see non-prejudiced behaviour as of little importance). Devine et al (2002) present evidence for 
the claim that those individuals who hold non-prejudiced behaviour to be important in itself appear prone 
to display less bias in the kinds of tests (specifically, tests for associations between black and white face or 
name primes and positive and negative word associations) described in section 1. The suggestion is that the 
negative or stereotypic associations may be weaker in these individuals, or they may have more effective 
mechanisms for regulating the manifestation of bias. Crucially, though, there is no suggestion here that this 
is done consciously or with effort, or indeed that this regulation is in response to an awareness of implicit 
bias.  Rather  the  hypothesis  is  that  preconscious  regulatory  systems  are  at  work:  a  sub-personal,  or 
automatic  inhibitory  system  may  prevent  the  influence  of  negative  associations  on  behaviour  and 
judgement. If so, then the manifestation of bias would appear to be a function of the agents attitudes, 
values and beliefs, rather than solely the culture they live in:  rather, having certain kinds of non-prejudiced 
explicit beliefs features as part of the story in claims regarding the extent to which individuals  manifest  
implicit biases (focusing now on premise 3b).
3) Finally, in more recent work on how we might understand the relationship between implicit and explicit 
beliefs, Nosek (2005) claims that the manifestation of bias does vary with self-reported preferences, such 
that it is plausible to suppose that there explicit and implicit attitudes are related. However, this relationship 
might be moderated by various additional considerations such as the strength of one’s preference for the 
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target object, one’s concerns about self-presentation, and the extent to which one’s preferences are in step 
with social norms. Because of the automatic nature of implicit attitudes, it is unsurprising that with respect 
to e.g. negative race biases, when an individual is concerned with self-presentation, explicit and implicit 
attitudes  diverge  (because  explicit  attitudes  might  be  shaped  by  self-presentation  concerns,  whereas 
implicit attitudes are less malleable). 
One of the striking findings from Nosek is that the relationship between implicit and explicit attitudes was 
stronger (more convergent) when the individual’s evaluative attitudes were perceived to be distinct from 
the perceived (by the subject) social norms. This makes it difficult to maintain the claim that, at least with 
respect to evaluative attitudes, IAT results indicate culturally absorbed knowledge or stereotypes, rather 
than personal attitudes. Nosek concludes that  'this effect is difficult to reconcile with the hypothesis that ... 
cultural knowledge influence[s] IAT performance' (p.579).20  
If we accept these findings, then we should reject at least one version of the argument from causal etiology 
against  responsibility  for  bias.  On  the  one  hand,  it  seems genuinely  an  open  question  as  to  whether 
individuals differ in the degree to which they  have biases; so it may well be that the presence of certain 
strong negative or stereotypic associations is  due to the result of (sexist,  racist)  cultures, and that it  is  
inappropriate to hold individuals responsible for  having biases (the argument may be valid, with premise 
3a). But there is reason to suppose that being influenced by bias is not solely the result of the sexist or racist 
culture in which one lives, and that premise 3b of the argument is false. Being influenced by implicit bias 
appears also to be an effect of the kinds of explicit beliefs and evaluations individuals make, as well as the 
strength of the agent's commitment to these values. So we cannot conclude, on this basis, that individuals 
are not blameworthy for being influenced by bias. The factors  which influence the manifestation of bias are 
important in relation to the argument from control, to which I now turn.
2.2 Argument from control (lack thereof).
Suppose we grant that the influence of bias is not something that results solely from cultural influence, but 
is affected also by the explicit and consciously held beliefs and values of an individual. We might still think 
that it is inappropriate to hold an individual liable for blame for the influence of the implicit associations on 
behaviour, because neither the presence of these associations, nor their influence, is under an individual's 
direct or immediate control. This is the second argument we took from Saul's remarks:
1. Individuals cannot be held responsible for cognitive states over which they do not have 
immediate and direct control.
2. Implicit biases are not under an agent's immediate and direct control.
3. Therefore, individuals cannot be held responsible for implicit biases they harbour.
Again, this argument could run in two different ways, depending upon our interpretation of premise 2:
2a. Having implicit biases is not under an agent's immediate and direct control.
3a. Therefore, individuals cannot be held responsible for implicit biases that they have.
2b. Manifesting - being influenced in behaviour and judgement by - implicit biases is not 
under an agent's immediate and direct control.
3b. Therefore, individuals cannot be held responsible for the influence of implicit biases on 
behaviour and judgement.
20 See also De Houwer, et al (2009) at p.353 for discussion of this dispute, and the conclusion that 'few arguments 
remain to support the claim that IAT effects are causally influenced by extrapersonal views [i.e. knowledge of 
cultural stereotypes].' However, I note in the concluding remarks of this essay that there may be reason to suppose 
that this may differ according to what kind of association the IAT is testing in any one study.
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There are two questions that need to be addressed: first, what kind of control, if any, do individuals have 
with respect  to implicit  biases? Secondly,  is  it  right to suppose that direct  and immediate control  over 
cognitive states is required for responsibility?
2.2.1 Direct Control over biases
Do individuals have direct and immediate control over biases? It is common for authors to contrast implicit 
attitudes and biases with controlled processes (see Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Gaertner & Dovidio 2000, 
Pearson et al 2009).21 Because these processes are automatic, and because the agents are typically not 
aware of their operation, it is assumed, they are not under the agent’s control.
I’ll return to consider the argument concerning awareness shortly. However, it is worth noting at this stage 
that some findings suggest that individuals do, at least sometimes, appear to be able to exercise direct and 
immediate control over the extent to which implicit biases influence behaviour. For example, some studies 
have lead researchers to be optimistic about individuals' abilities to exert conscious control in attempting to 
suppress any negative or stereotypic associations. When instructed  not to display, e.g. sexism or racism, 
individuals  were  recorded  as  in  fact  showing  less  biased  responses  in  experimental  tests  for  implicit 
attitudes (Monteith et al 1998b). 
However,  serious  concerns  have been  raised  about  these  studies.  Whilst  individuals  can,  for  a  limited 
period,  suppress the influence of  implicit  bias,  many studies have shown that this  tends to result  in  a 
‘rebound effect’ – whereby having tried to suppress negative or stereotypical biases, the influence of such 
biases are more strongly shown when this effortful suppression is not maintained. One hypothesis that 
might explain this rebound effect is that the unconscious ‘monitoring’  process for the presence of  (for 
example) the stereotype means that it is made more accessible to later activation (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 
2000; Macrae, Nodenhausen, Mine & Jetten 1994).22
Whilst strictly speaking, then, some empirical studies support the claim that individuals at least sometimes 
have direct control (so that premise 2b is false), it is  not clear that we should want to place too much 
emphasis  on  these  studies.  Firstly,  the  effectiveness  of  conscious  suppression  seems  at  best  limited. 
Secondly, given the likelihood of the rebound effects, it is problematic to hold individuals responsible for 
not trying to exercise such control. If one cares about not being biased, then conscious suppression would 
be a risky strategy which would appear to later increase the influence of bias.23
21  Dovidio, J. F., & Gaertner, S. L. (2000). Aversive racism and selection decisions: 1989 and 1999 Psychological Sci-
ence 11: 319–323; Dovidio, J. F., & Gaertner, S. L. (2004). Aversive racism. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances inexperi-
mental social psychology (Vol. 36, pp. 1–51). San Diego, CA: Academic Press; Pearson, Dovidio and Samuel L. Gaert-
ner, 2009, The Nature of Contemporary Prejudice: Insights from Aversive Racism, Social and Personality Psychology 
Compass 3. pp.1-25
22  Galinsky, A. D., & Moskowitz, G. B. (2000). Perspective-taking: Decreasing stereotype expression, stereotype 
accessibility, andin-group favoritism. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 78(4), 708–724; Macrae, N., 
Bodenhausen, GV., Milne, AB. & Jetten, J. (1994). 'Out of Mind but Back in Sight – Stereotypes on the Rebound'. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol 67, no. 5, pp. 808-817
23  Monteith, Spicer & Tooman, 1998 Consequences of Stereotype Suppression: Stereotypes on AND Not on the 
Rebound, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology Volume 34 (4) pp. 355-377. Monteith et al have argued that 
the propensity to experience any such rebound effect will depend on other features of the individual: those who 
are low-prejudiced (on explicit measures) are less susceptible to it (Monteith et al, 1998a). They propose other 
factors that may decrease susceptibility to implicit biases, and conclude that conscious suppression may, in the 
presence of these features be an effective method of regulation. See Monteith, Sherman & Devine (1998b) 
Suppression as a Stereotype control strategy. Personality and Social Psychology Review, vol.2(1), pp62-83. These 
findings remain controversial, however, and for the reasons above we should hesitate to hold individuals 
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2.2.2 Is direct control a necessary condition for moral responsibility?
Whether or not individuals are able to directly control the influence of biases will matter a great deal to the  
issue of responsibility if we accept premise 1 of the argument from control, above:
1. Individuals cannot be held responsible for cognitive states over which they do not have 
immediate and direct control.
The idea that control is necessary for responsibility is a plausible one. In the literature on free will, the idea 
that a necessary condition for free will and responsibility for some action, A, is that one is able to do not-A 
(and  so  has  direct  control  over  whether  one  does  A),  garners  considerable  support.24 But  many  have 
rejected this condition, and indeed we might doubt whether this premise is true.25 I here set out some of 
the considerations pertinent to our present concern with responsibility for bias, which speak in favour of 
rejecting the direct control requirement. 
Lots of the things we are able to do are the result of the exercise of long range, rather than direct and 
immediate, control: the ability to sustain concentration, play the piano well, lose or gain weight, speak a 
second language. The doing of these things is not under an individual’s direct and immediate control, but 
rather  the  result  of  ‘long  range’  control.  We  are  able  to  exercise  (direct)  control  over  a  series  of 
intermediate steps (placing hands on a keyboard, increasing food intake), such that we have non-immediate 
control over whether we are able to do those things. Many of these activities are, in the usual run of things, 
morally neutral,  but it  is  nonetheless appropriate to regard each other as responsible agents when we 
engage in such activities, or exercise the long range control necessary for their pursuit. Moreover, long 
range control may be important to some morally relevant activities. The cultivation of virtue, such that one 
is  able  to  act  generously,  is  something  that  results  from long range control,  according  to  some virtue 
ethicists.
But these are examples of skills or activities for which, whilst we cannot do them at will, we are plausibly 
responsible. What about responsibility for cognitive states? The question of whether direct (or ‘voluntary’) 
control  is  a  necessary  condition  for  responsibility  arises  in  debates  about  epistemic  obligation  more 
generally. It has been asked whether individuals ought (or are permitted, or have a right) to hold certain 
beliefs - and can be held responsible (epistemically or morally) for failing to do so. On the assumption that 
ought implies can, it is difficult to see how individuals could be obliged to believe p unless it is the case that 
they can - voluntarily, ‘at will’ or by deciding to do so - believe p. And believing p doesn’t seem to be the 
kind of thing we can do voluntarily, or at will – we don’t have direct control over our beliefs in this way. 
Nonetheless, it has been argued that this lack of direct control does not confound the claim that individuals 
have epistemic obligations, and are responsible for meeting these. Two lines of argument are pertinent 
here. 
First,  consider the indirect  kind of  long range control  we might have over  our  beliefs  (Feldman, 2000; 
responsible for failing to attempt direct control.
24  See e.g. Van Inwagen, P. 1975. The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism, Philosophical Studies, 27: 185–
99; Ginet, C. 1996, In Defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: Why I Don't Find Frankfurt's Argument 
Convincing, Philosophical Perspectives, 10: 403–17; Wideker, D. 1995. Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the 
Principle of Alternative Possibilities, Philosophical Review, 104: 247–61. 
25  Those who have rejected this condition for responsibility include Frankfurt, H. 1971. Freedom of the Will and the 
Concept of a Person, Journal of Philosophy, 68: 5–20; Wolf, S. 1980. Asymmetrical Freedom, Journal of Philosophy, 
77: 157–66; Fischer J. & Ravizza, M. 1998. Responsibility and Control: An Essay on Moral Responsibility, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
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Hieronymi, 2008).26 We cannot simply decide to believe that p (e.g. that the Ozone layer is depleting). But 
we  could undertake enquiry and take into account various sources of evidence so that we form appropriate 
beliefs about the Ozone layer (that it is, indeed, depleting). We could even undertake an enquiry that sets 
out to ensure we have the belief that the Ozone layer is depleting, by being selective about the evidence we 
consider – although doing so is epistemically (and perhaps even morally) problematic. Precisely because we 
have this long-range control, we can be held responsible (and sometimes blameworthy) for our beliefs.27 
The  same  can  be  said  for  cognitive  states  that  involve  evaluation:  Murdoch  describes  the  attentional 
processes by which a  woman comes to  revise  her initially  negative  view of  her  daughter-in-law.28 It  is 
plausible that we have this kind of indirect control not only over our beliefs, but also over our affective 
responses also. These cases are ones in which the agent has intentionally exercised long range control.
Secondly, we might think it  appropriate to hold individuals  responsible where their cognitive states are 
reflective of their evaluative stance, or their ‘take on the world’, so to speak. Support for this view is found 
in the work of both Hieronymi, and Arpaly. On Hieronymi’s view, it is appropriate to hold people responsible 
for their beliefs even in the absence of direct control, and in the presence of only limited indirect control. She 
writes: '[b]ecause these attitudes [beliefs]  embody our take on the world, on what is or is not true or 
important or worthwhile in it, we control them by thinking about the world, about what is or is not true or 
important or worthwhile in it' (2008, p.371). Whilst we cannot simply believe whatever we want, or think it  
good to believe, we can (perhaps non-intentionally or unconsciously) be selective about what evidence we 
look for, and how we interpret or weigh it (given the constraints on time and effort, such selectivity will not 
always be problematic). So, even if we cannot directly control our beliefs, by believing at will, the fact that 
they are responsive to evidence means that they are reflective of certain evaluative stances that we might 
take with respect to seeking and weighing evidence. We might say, then, that we are indirectly responsible 
for these beliefs insofar as they are causally and rationally related to other things that we  are  directly 
responsible for.
Further,  Arpaly’s  remarks (on the nature of  moral  worth) elaborate on this  way in which we might be 
indirectly responsible for our beliefs. For most people, exposed to the vicissitudes of daily life, certain false 
sexist beliefs, or false beliefs about a Jewish conspiracy, she suggests, cannot be properly thought of as 
honest mistakes. Rather, such beliefs, she hypothesises, are likely the result of motivated irrationality, for 
such beliefs have to be maintained in the face of what should be recognised as adequate countervailing 
evidence. Insofar as it is reasonable to hold individuals responsible for the ill  will or moral indifference, 
which sustains these beliefs, we can hold them responsible for their false and prejudiced beliefs (over which 
they do not have  direct or voluntary control).29 These beliefs are a function of other states over which 
individuals do have control – so individuals can be held liable to blame for these beliefs.
There  are  two  central  thoughts  in  the  claims  sketched  (albeit  briefly)  above:  firstly,  that  direct  and 
immediate control is not necessary for moral responsibility. This is plausibly the case with respect to both 
26  Hieronymi, P. Responsibility for Believing, Synthese 161, no. 3 (April 2008): 357–373; Feldman, R. (2008). Modest 
Deontologism in Epistemology. Synthese 161 (3):339 - 355.
27 It is worth noting Hieronymi’s emphasis on the point that even this kind of indirect influence is significantly limited: 
even in exercising indirect influence, an individual cannot believe for just any reason. She can properly hold some 
belief only for reasons bearing on its truth.
28 Murdoch, I. 1970[1985] The Sovereignty of Good, (Routeldge, London) 32-35.
29 A contrast case Arpaly provides: an individual who holds racist or sexist beliefs due to a very insular life in which he 
has been exposed to no counter-evidence which could persuade him of the falsity of his beliefs (e.g. beliefs that 
black people are of inferior intelligence, that women cannot hold leadership roles). If such an individual's beliefs 
really are the result of unfortunate exposure to partial evidence, rather than irrationally motivated, we would 
expect her to revise her beliefs upon e.g. leaving her closeted existence for work or  university and encountering 
intelligent female black colleagues or lecturers. See Arpaly, 2003, Unprincipled Virtue OUP.
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actions, and beliefs, both factual and evaluative. So, premise 1 of the argument from control should be 
rejected.  The second important point here is that this kind of (constrained) indirect influence is plausibly 
sufficient for moral responsibility with respect to some cognitive state, insofar as these cognitive states 
reflect the agent’s stance, or take on the world (by reflecting her partial or ill-motivated attention to the 
available evidence, for example).
We are now in a position to ask whether individuals exercise indirect influence over implicit biases, either 
intentionally or otherwise.
2.2.3. Indirect Control over biases
Whilst we have seen serious concerns with about the claim that individuals have, and ought to exercise, 
direct control over their biases, there is considerably more data on the extent to which individuals have 
indirect and non-immediate control over the influence of implicit biases. I’ll here briefly mention three ways 
in which it appears that individuals have control, albeit indirect and non-immediate, over the manifestation 
of biases in behaviour and action. 
Note that the first two kinds of control I discuss require intentional undertaking, so will only be relevant to 
cases in which individuals  know they are biased and seek to mitigate this. This is an important kind of 
control,  but recognising this  is  consonant with Saul’s  remarks  about individuals  being blameworthy for 
failing to take steps to remedy bias once they are aware of it. This kind of control is not one that will be 
useful to those who are not aware that they are biased. But it is nonetheless important to identify the kinds 
of  control  individuals  can exercise over biases,  because this  helps  us to understand in more detail  the 
operation of implicit biases, and to scrutinise the experimental findings in relation to these kinds of control. 
These are considerations that are pertinent to the question of what individuals may do in order to  take 
responsibility for implicit bias.
However,  I  will  also  suggest  that  the  third  kind  of  control  (indirect)  can  make  it  appropriate  to  hold 
individuals responsible and sometimes blameworthy for the influence of bias on behaviour, even in the 
absence of awareness of bias (and this takes us to face squarely the argument from awareness).
i.  Intentional  long-range  control  I:  exposure  to  counter-stereotypical  exemplars  or  members  of 
stigmatised groups
Some things that are under our voluntary control appear to have indirect influence on the extent to which 
biases influence behaviour and judgement. One of those is exposure to members of the stigmatised group, 
or to counter-stereotypical exemplars. We might not be able to rid ourselves of, or limit the influence of 
biases at will. But just as we are able to seek out evidence which influences our beliefs, empirical findings 
suggest that we are able to undertake steps which mitigate the influence of biases.
Blair  (2002)30 reports  on  studies  in  which  participants  who  were  exposed  to  pictures  of  counter-
stereotypical exemplars showed less bias than individuals in control conditions. It appears that even simply 
thinking  about  individuals  who  are  counter-stereotypical  (e.g.  an  admired  black  person)  can  limit  the 
manifestation  of  negative  implicit  bias  against  black  people  (the  importance  of  counter-stereotypical 
exemplars is emphasised in Saul, ms).31
30 Blair, I. 2002. The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice, Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3: 
242-261. See p.249. 
31  Heidi Howkins Lockwood Counterstereotypical and Uncanny Exemplars: Moving Beyond the Mere Maximisation of 
Smartness (ms.) raises some important concerns for this strategy also: namely, are there any constraints on the 
kinds of exemplars that are effective? Should we be seeking the most counter-stereotypical of exemplars, or rather 
any individuals who do not meet the stereotyped role? 
12
Jules.Holroyd@nottingham.ac.uk
In further studies, simply having contact with the stereotyped individual served to decrease the influence of 
bias. On completing an IAT, those individuals who did so in the presence of a black experimenter displayed 
less race bias than those who completed the test in the presence of a white experimenter (Lowery et al 
2001). One hypothesis advanced is that automatic processes - such as implicit associations - are sensitive to 
the social context. Another is that they are sensitive to evidence - and so the associations are weakened 
when presented with clear counterexamples (see Lowery et al for discussion).32
So,  one indirect  way of  controlling  the influence of  bias  is  to  intentionally  increase one's  exposure  to 
members of stigmatised groups, and to have present to mind counter-stereotypical exemplars. This seems 
to suggest that individuals have the kind of long range control, at least over the manifestation of biases, 
discussed in the previous subsection.33
ii. Intentional Long-range control II: Implementation intentions
Recent studies have revealed another strategy with which individuals may be able to intentionally exercise 
long  range  control  over  their  biases.  Studies  in  empirical  psychology  have  argued  for  the  efficacy  of 
'implementation  intentions'  in  bringing  about  changes  in  responses  guided  by  implicit  biases  (see 
Gollwitzer, Bayer & McCulloch, 2005 and Webb & Sheeran 2007, for overview).34 Implementation intentions 
differ from (straightforward) intentions, either in having a built in conditional ('If I'm in condition C, I'll do 
X'), or being tied to particular environmental cues ('When I arrive at D/at E o'clock/when I see F, I'll do X'). In 
studies where participants attempt to change behaviour (often addictive or habitual behaviour), those in 
the implementation intention condition are reliably more successful in achieving the specified behaviour 
change than those who just form general intentions ('I'll do X'). The hypothesis is that the agent's goals are,  
with  implementation  intentions,  sensitised  to  environmental  cues,  such  that  the  goals  (to  do  X)  are 
automatically activated in certain contexts. 
Recently, it  has been suggested that implicit  biases might be effectively regulated with implementation 
intentions.35 For example, if one harbours biases about Muslim people (e.g. cognitive associations between 
Muslims and terrorism), the influence of these biases could be controlled by forming an implementation 
intention for one’s responses in the IAT’s: ‘If Muslim names and peace are at the top of the screen, then I 
respond especially fast to Muslim words and peace words!’ (Webb, Scheeran & Pepper, 2010, p.11). The 
formulation of  such implementation intentions  resulted in  faster  response times to  Muslim and  peace 
prompts than participants in other conditions. Indeed, with the implementation intention, these response 
32 Lowery, B. S., Hardin, C. D., & Sinclair, S. (2001). Social influence effects on automatic racial prejudice. Journal of  
Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 842–855.
33 See also Kang & Banaji 2006, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of "Affirmative Action" California Law 
Review 94, 1063-1118. See esp pp.1101-1108 for discussion of the social contact hypothesis and the de-biasing 
effects of counter-stereotypical exemplars.
34  Gollwitzer, P. M., Bayer, U. C., & McCulloch, K. C. (2005). The control of the unwanted. In J. A. Bargh, J. Uleman, & 
R. Hassin (Eds.), The New Unconscious (pp. 485–515). Oxford: Oxford University Press; Webb, T.L. & Sheeran, P. 
(2007). How do implementation intentions promote goal attainment? A test of component processes. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology 43, 295-302. 
See also Gollwitzer, P. M., & Schaal, B. (1998). Metacognition in action: The importance of implementation 
intentions. Personality and SocialPsychology Review, 2, 124–136
35  Webb, Sheeran and Pepper  2010 Gaining control over responses to implicit attitude tests: Implementation 
intentions engender fast responses on attitude-incongruent trials British Journal of Social Psychology, 
DOI:10.1348/014466610X532192; 
Stewart & Payne, Bringing Automatic Stereotyping Under Control: Implementation Intentions as Efficient Means of 
Thought Control Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 2008 34: 1332-1345.
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times were commensurate with the association between  Scottish and  peace targets, suggesting that the 
formulation of an implementation intention mitigated almost entirely the manifestation of biases. 
However,  I  think  there  are  further  questions  about  these  results  in  terms  of  whether  they  can  be 
generalised  to  the  manifestation  of  biases  in  other  contexts:  where  the  implementation  intention  is 
specifically  attuned to  the completion  of  an IAT,  considerable  attention is   needed  to  whether  similar 
intentions could be applicable for non-laboratory conditions. In particular, the form of the implementation 
intention  outside  of  the  lab  might  need  to  be  considerably  different:  a  ‘fast  response’  will  not  be 
appropriate (or even coherent!) in many every day contexts. However , implementation intentions have 
recently been shown to effectively shape behaviour, such as for example, influencing the seating distance 
between  experimental  participants  and  members  of  a  stigmatised  group  (those  with  implementation 
intentions to show warmth as soon as they had the chance to do so, sat nearer).36 One might suppose that 
alternative, more general, implementation intentions could be formulated: ‘If I see a Muslim, I will think 
‘peace’’. But it is worth noting that the structure of these intentions is quite different from those tested by 
Webb et al in the lab, focusing on the implicit association itself, rather than the behavioural response to 
certain targets. This is clearly fertile territory for more empirical work.
However,  findings  about  the  efficacy  of  implementation  intentions  even  in  the  limited  context  of  the 
laboratory  tests  have  implications  for  our  concerns  here.  For  this  research  indicates  once  again  that 
individuals can exercise long range control over the manifestation of bias in behaviour, at least in some 
contexts. 
iii. Unintentional Indirect Control: Influence of explicit beliefs and values. 
The previous  two sub-sections  outline  long-range control  strategies  that  individuals  might  intentionally 
undertake to limit or remove the influence of implicit biases. The control condition for responsibility, then, 
may be met (at least in some contexts) when individuals are aware that these kinds of long range control 
over biases are required. But it is worth returning to some of the studies mentioned earlier, pertaining to 
the unintentional  influence of  explicit  beliefs  and values  on an individual's  implicit  biases:  namely,  the 
manifestation of implicit bias might be influenced by the explicit beliefs, values and goals that individuals 
hold. 
Indirect control in relation to beliefs
These  considerations  support  the  claim  that  individuals  can  indirectly  and  unintentionally  control  the 
manifestation of biases even when they are unaware of the possibility of influence. As detailed above, in 
studying race bias, Devine et al. (2002) found patterns of responses which indicate that individuals who are 
highly committed to responding without prejudice, for its own sake (and not rather or also for reasons of 
social pressure or norms), manifest significantly less negative race bias across a range of tests for implicit 
biases.
Importantly, they argue that their results cannot be explained by such individuals exerting conscious control 
(in at least one of their studies, individuals completed the tests under a heavy cognitive load, to try to 
prevent  any  attempts  at  conscious  control).  Rather,  they  suggest  that  strong  commitments  to  avoid 
prejudice may weaken any implicit negative associations, or may limit the activation of such associations in 
the production of behaviour and judgement (2002, 845-847). 
The claim isn’t simply that having non-prejudiced beliefs makes one less likely to manifest bias, so that 
36  Tidswell, K., Sheeran, P. & Webb, T. L. (2012). Self-regulation of the impact of implicit attitudes on behavior. 
Unpublished manuscript. University of Sheffield.
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individuals ought to make sure they reject explicit racist beliefs. Rather, important differences showed up 
with respect to different anti-racist beliefs. Individuals who endorsed non-prejudiced behaviour for its own 
sake (e.g. ‘I attempt to act in nonprejudiced ways toward Black people because it is personally important to 
me’)  rather  than for  instrumental  reasons (e.g.  ‘If  I  acted prejudiced toward Black  people,  I  would  be 
concerned that others would be angry with me’) manifested less bias in experimental conditions. Those 
who  endorsed  such  instrumental  reasons,  or  endorsed  instrumental  reasons  in  addition  to  the  non-
instrumental  reasons  for  avoiding  prejudiced  responses,  displayed  greater  bias  (that  is,  the  difference 
between response times to congruent and incongruent pairs was larger). The reasons for which one cares 
about non-prejudiced behaviour then – and in particular, a commitment to it for its own sake – is indirectly 
related to the degree to which individuals manifest bias. 
Indirect control in relation to goals and attitudes
Explicit beliefs and values may affect the influence of bias in another way. Moskowitz & Li (2011) draw 
attention  to  the  importance  of  having  the  goal  of  treating  people  non-prejudicially,  and  argue  that 
individuals who are committed to this goal are less likely to manifest bias in responses to tests for implicit 
biases.37 Crucially,  they  draw attention to  the importance of  activating the  relevant  goals  (rather  than 
merely having them), where a goal’s being active means that it is operative in the production of action.38 We 
have all sorts of goals, and they can’t all be at work in producing action at once. The idea, broadly speaking, 
is that only some of our many goals are active at any one time, and their activation blocks the activation of 
others – else all of our goals will be active all of the time, and this might hinder the effective pursuit of any  
one of them. 
Importantly, Moskowitz & Li set out evidence in support of the hypothesis that the activation of certain 
goals (such as the goal to treat people fairly) can, at the sub-personal level regulate the manifestation of 
biases. When the goal to treat people non-prejudicially was active, less biased responses were recorded. In 
contrast, they found that in the experimental condition where prior success in relation to the goal to treat 
individuals non-prejudicially was contemplated – and therefore that goal deactivated, because achieved - 
then the inhibition of biases is diminished. This is because other goals, which implicit biases may serve 
(such as efficiency),  are no longer then inhibited.  Importantly,  the non-prejudice related goal  may only 
inhibit the influence of bias when it is active. These findings are consonant with those of Park et al (2008), 
who argue that individuals with automatized goal to behave in a non-prejudiced manner displayed less race 
bias on a number of tests for implicit attitudes. 39
For  our purposes,  this  brings to light  the following important distinction:  distinction between having a 
particular goal (of treating people non-prejudicially) and that goal being ‘active’ in the production of action. 
This suggests that not only caring strongly about treating people non-prejudicially for its own sake, but 
having those goals activated, is important in mitigating the influence of negative biases on action. Whether 
or not we have a particular goal is something that is under our control.  But more importantly, the key 
modulating consideration in this experiment was whether the individual dwelt on a case of prior success in 
treating people fairly, or a case of failure. Reflecting on a case of success, they claim, deactivated the goal 
such that it no longer played a bias-blocking role in their responses.
37  Moskowitz, G.B., & Li, P. (2011). Egalitarian goals trigger stereotype inhibition: A proactive form of stereotype 
control. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology.
38  Psychologists have identified various ways of discerning when a goal is active: these include increased value 
attached to the means to one’s goal; decrease in value attached to means when goal is secured; increased value 
attached to, and influence of, the goal as the distance from goal attainment decreases; increased influence of the 
goal as the probability of achievement increases; decreased influence of competing goals, etc. (Forster, Seven 
Principles of Goal Priming 2007.)
39  Park, S. H., Glaser, J., & Knowles, E. D. (2008). Implicit motivation to control prejudice moderates the effect of  cog-
nitive depletion on unintended discrimination. Social Cognition 26:401–419
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This suggests that even whilst holding the goal of treating people fairly, being easily satisfied or confident 
that one has not and does not treat others prejudicially may lead to being more biased. If such an attitude 
means the goal of treating people fairly is not activated, then an individual with these beliefs is preventing 
an effective automatic bias limiting strategy from taking effect. The importance of the goal remaining active 
counsels against self-satisfaction with one’s efforts to treat others fairly; a certain humility would appear to 
be important in ensuring that the goals to behave non-prejudicially remain active.
Again, there is significant further work to be done here, including on the question of how one might best 
‘activate’ or ‘trigger’, a particular goal. Moskowitz & Li asked individuals who had the relevant goal to dwell 
on a case in which they had failed to live up to it. It is important to note their emphasis that a goal can be 
activated (by priming) and operative, such that it is effective in blocking stereotype activation, ‘even if [the 
subject] is not consciously aware of the goal’ (2011, p.114). Given that we cannot always introspectively 
access whether the relevant goals are activated, finding out more about the specific strategies for ensuring 
one’s bias blocking goal is activated, would be fruitful.
How do these findings inform our understanding of an individual’s responsibility, and liability to blame, for 
bias? We have seen that increased influence of negative implicit associations are related to - caused by - 
states that are under our control, such as the explicit beliefs about the reasons for treating individuals fairly, 
or  a ready satisfaction that one has succeeded in doing so. In these cases, we might think it appropriate to 
hold individuals responsible for not caring enough, or in the right way, about non-prejudiced behaviour, or 
being unduly satisfied with one’s treatment of others as fair.  In such cases, whilst the implicit bias is not 
itself under the direct control of the agent, it is indirectly a function of these explicit beliefs or attitudes. I 
think that in such cases it is appropriate to hold individuals responsible for the increased manifestation of 
biases. 
I want to provide additional support for this claim by considering how we might judge the following two 
examples:  first,  consider  an individual  who has  prejudiced  beliefs  about  black  people,  and  as  a  result 
experiences certain affective and physiological states of discomfort whilst in the presence of black people. 
Even if she tries to suppress her explicit prejudice (by, say, speaking in a polite tone) she cannot but give off 
subtly different cues which negatively affect her interactions (empirical studies suggest that subtle signs of 
discomfort, such as increased blinking, more infrequent eye contact are often detected in interactions).40 
Such affective and physiological states are not under the agent’s direct and voluntary control; nor may she 
be aware of them or their effects on her interaction. But they are causally related to the explicit beliefs that 
she has, and over which she has long range control. 
Next, consider an individual who believes it is important not to treat people in a prejudiced way, because 
doing so would cause general tension and anger, and is confident that she has in the past, and will continue 
to in fact treat people fairly. She acts in accordance with these beliefs, but nonetheless does give off subtly 
different cues (increased blinking, more infrequent eye contact), as a result of implicit negative associations 
she harbours, and these affect the quality of her interaction.  These responses are not under her direct and 
voluntary control. But they are causally related to the extent and strength of her commitment to caring 
about treating people fairly for its own sake. Were she to care more about treating people fairly for its own 
sake, or were she to be more scrupulous about whether she meets her ideals - and less easily satisfied that 
she does - there is reason to suppose that less bias would affect her interactions.
40  Amodio, Harmon-Jones & Devine, 2003, Individual Differences in the Activation and Control of Affective Race Bias 
as Assessed by Startle Eyeblink Response and Self-Report,  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 84, No. 
4, 738–753
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I find it plausible to hold both of these individuals responsible and liable to blame for the kind of automatic  
responses that affect the quality of their interactions, insofar as they are causally related to their explicit 
beliefs and attitudes, and so something over which they have indirect control. The two cases are structurally 
analogous. So if one is to deny that individuals are responsible for the manifestation of implicit bias due to 
the lack of direct control, then one ought also to deny that individuals are responsible for the negative 
physiological responses that affect the quality of interactions in the first example (though, of course, the 
extent to which one may be blameworthy may vary with the blameworthiness of the explicit attitudes). This 
seems to me an implausible denial: rather the relationship between the physiological responses (or biases) 
and explicit values or beliefs (over which agents do have control) makes it appropriate to hold individuals 
responsible for these automatic responses.
iv. summary
The main argument of this section has been to reject the requirement for direct and immediate control as 
necessary for responsibility. I suggested that there are good reasons for supposing indirect control or long 
range control is sufficient for moral responsibility. I then presented evidence supportive of Saul’s remark 
that individuals can be held responsible for failing to respond to the knowledge they are biased; this is 
pertinent to the issue of  what individuals can do to take responsibility for implicit  bias.  But further, in 
relation to the question of blame for being influenced by implicit bias, I argued that individuals might also 
be reasonably held responsible for the manifestation of biases where this is causally related to explicit 
beliefs or attitudes individual holds.
At this point, the following objection might be raised: it isn't reasonable to hold someone liable for blame 
for failing to undertake long range control strategies to mitigate bias if they are not aware of the existence 
of biases in their cognitive processes. Nor is it reasonable to hold individuals responsible for the biases that 
are causally related to their explicit beliefs if they are unaware of these causal corollaries of their beliefs, 
values or goals. This brings us directly to the argument from unawareness, so I'll turn to consider that in 
more detail now.
2.3 Argument from lack of awareness
Recall the third argument that we identified earlier, for the conclusion that individuals are not responsible 
for cognitive states or features of which they are unaware. This argument must proceed as follows:
1. Individuals can only be held responsible for cognitive features that they are aware they 
possess.
2. Individuals are not aware of cognitive features such as implicit bias
3. Therefore, individuals cannot be held responsible for their implicit biases.
Again, we can identify the two versions of premise 2:
2a. Individuals are not aware of the presence of cognitive features such as implicit bias
2b. Individuals are not aware of the influence on their decisions and actions of cognitive 
features such as implicit bias.41
Premise 2a, which pertains to the existence of implicit biases, seems plausible: the presence of cognitive 
41  DeHouwer et al (2009) also identify two further dimensions of awareness that are relevant: awareness of the 
stimuli in the experimental tests, and awareness of the origins of the attitude being tested (see p.357). De Houwer, 
Teige-Mocigemba, Spruty & Moors, (2009) Implicit Measures: A Normative Analysis and Review, Psychological  
Bulletin, 135(3) pp.347-368.
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associations of the sort discerned on implicit association tests is most likely something we are unaware of. 
Were we able to detect implicit biases by means of introspection, we would not need such sophisticated 
indirect measures to discern the presence of such biases.
What of premise 2b, which speaks to the manifestation of biases in behaviour? Interestingly, some research 
has shown that individuals are sometimes aware of the discrepancies between how they would act and 
how they believe they ought to, thus demonstrating an awareness of their proneness to being influenced by 
bias (if not an introspective awareness of the bias itself operating). For example, Monteith & Voils (1998) 
found that individuals reported different degrees of discrepancy between how they believed they  should 
act in a given situation, and how they would act (this was true of both high and low-prejudiced individuals). 
With  low-prejudiced  individuals,  these  reported  discrepancies  reliably  correlated  with  the  degrees  of 
implicit bias manifested on tests for implicit attitudes, indicating that individuals were accurately tracking 
the extent to which their actions were biased and fell short of their non-prejudicial normative standards.42 
In later studies, findings suggest that sometimes (64% of the participants in the race IAT), individuals are 
aware  of  their  discrepant  responses  on  IATs,  and  some  of  those  individuals  (37%)  attribute  those 
discrepancies to negative attitudes they suppose they harbour (Monteith et al 2001).43 How to make sense, 
then, of  the cases in which individuals report  surprise – and shock – at  the implicit  biases revealed in 
experimental contexts? There are two possible explanations: first, these individuals may be in the group of 
individuals who are not aware of the discrepancies in action. Second, it might be that occasionally factors 
other than implicit attitudes affect IAT results – so the individuals may be right to be surprised if the results 
are attributed to negative implicit attitudes.44 
Two points  are worth emphasising  here,  though:  firstly,  these  findings about  individuals'  awareness  of 
discrepancies were limited to the highly artificial experimental context (the discrepancy report exercise and 
the bias manifested on the evaluative task  set),  and it  isn’t  clear whether  we can generalise  to  other 
contexts. Secondly, when assessing the discrepancies, very few people reported a small discrepancy,45 and 
even those who reported small discrepancies between how they would and should act still displayed some 
bias, albeit less than those who reported greater expected discrepancies in how they would and should act. 
What  this  means is  that  whilst  some individuals  appear  to  be aware of  the  extent  to  which they  are 
disposed to fall short of their non-prejudiced ideals there is no evidence to suggest that the belief ‘I don’t 
behave in a way discrepant with my ideals’ would predict non-biased behaviour. Indeed, given the small 
proportion of individuals who appeared to show little discrepancy between ideals and behaviour, it is likely 
that we are in the portion of the population who manifest greater discrepancies. And, if we think we do not 
act in discrepant ways at all, it is likely we are guilty of self-deception. Thus Monteith et al (2001) emphasise 
that: ‘we were unable to garner convincing evidence that people’s self-reports of being free of discrepant 
responses correspond to an underlying lack of racial bias at the implicit level’ (p.409).
Let’s now reconsider the argument in full:
42  See also Devine et al, 1991, Prejudice With and Without Compunction Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
Vol. 60, No. 6, 817-830
43  Monteith, Voils, Ashburn-Nardo, (2001) Taking a Look Underground: Detecting, Interpreting and Reacting to 
Implicit Racial Biases, Social Cognition 19(4) pp395-417.
44 De Houwer et al (2009) suggest that 'salience asymmetries' – namely, differences in the extent to which the 
participants are familiar with some of the categories in the test (e.g. white participants may be more familiar with 
white names) – might account for some results on the IAT. See p.353-357.
45  13% had a small ‘discrepancy score’. These scores were computed by subtracting the ‘should’ score from the 
‘would’ score – these, in turn, had been assigned according to reports of how individuals should act or feel (from a 
set of descriptors, e.g. ‘I should not feel uncomfortable about having a Black roommate’), and would act or feel 
(from a set of descriptions, e.g. ‘I would feel uncomfortable if I was assigned a Black roommate’). The scales were 
constructed so that the higher the score, the greater the prejudice.
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1b. Individuals can only be held responsible for their decisions and actions if they are aware of the 
influences of various cognitive states on those decisions or actions.
2b. Individuals are not aware of the influence on their decisions and actions of cognitive features 
such as implicit bias.
3b. Therefore, individuals cannot be held responsible for the manifestation of their implicit biases 
(the actions that are influenced by implicit biases).
I have suggested that there are good reasons to accept the argument for the conclusion that we are not 
responsible for the presence of implicit biases in our cognitive states. This is the conclusion emphasised by 
Saul, in her remarks that ‘a person should not be blamed for an implicit  bias that they are completely 
unaware of’ (p.29). But this doesn’t settle the question of responsibility. For it does not follow from this that 
individuals are not liable for blame for their actions which manifest implicit biases, nor that they are not 
responsible for being influenced by biases. 
Firstly, this is because premise 2b appears to be impugnable: if some individuals are aware that there is a 
discrepancy  between  their  actions  and  their  normative  expectations,  then  (whilst  not  aware  of  the 
processes  that  account  for  this)  they  are  to  a  certain  extent  aware  of  their  biased  behaviour;  that 
something is influencing their actions such that they fall short of their ideals (in the studies discussed in 
Monteith 2001, 37% of those who reported they were aware of discrepant responses attributed these 
disrepancies to negative associations). This awareness will be important in enabling individuals to undertake 
the long-range control strategies outlined above.
But more importantly, there is also good reason to reject premise 1b. It is not a necessary condition for 
responsibility that individuals are aware of the influence of certain cognitive states on their decisions and 
actions. One reason for rejecting this condition for responsibility is that it is unreasonably demanding, and if 
accepted would lead to the kind of  global  scepticism about responsibility  that  has been recently  been 
endorsed by some. Doris  (2009) has extrapolated from empirical  findings on unexpected influences on 
behaviour  that  we  do  not  display  the  kind  of  reflective  self-direction  arguably  necessary  for  moral 
responsibility.46 We might for various reasons think that Doris  is  mistaken in endorsing this  scepticism. 
However, the important point for present purposes is simply that this kind of scepticism cannot be avoided 
if we endorse premise 1 of this argument. It entails that very many (all?) of our actions – not only automatic  
actions, guided by habit, but also actions guided by well executed reflective deliberation – are not ones for 
which we are responsible.  Some may be content with this kind of sceptical conclusion. In this context, 
however, the argument from unawareness is working to draw a contrast between those actions for which 
we are responsible and those actions which, because influenced by bias, are not ones for which we are 
liable for blame.  If we want to retain this contrast, then we should not accept premise 1 of the argument 
from unawareness.
That an individual lacks awareness of biases that influence her action and judgements, then, does not in 
itself provide reason for concluding that individuals are not responsible for being influenced by implicit 
biases.
2.4 Argument from lack of reasons-responsiveness
Finally,  let’s  turn to the argument from lack of  reasons-responsiveness,  which can be reconstructed as 
follows:
1. Individuals cannot be held responsible for traits that are not responsive to reasons
46  Doris, (2009) Skepticism About Persons. Philosophical Issues 19 (1):57-91
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2. Implicit biases are not responsive to reasons
3. Therefore, individuals cannot be held responsible for implicit biases.
Let’s distinguish, once again, between:
2a. The harbouring of implicit bias is not responsive to reasons
2b. The manifestation of biases (the automatic processes by which biases operate in the production 
of action) are not reasons responsive.
There  is  not  here  space  to  do  justice  to  the  complexities  of  the  literature  on  reasons-responsiveness 
conditions for moral responsibility. We can very roughly characterise those views as follows: 
An individual is responsible for her actions if the action issues from mental processes which are 
regularly  responsive  to  reasons  (including  some  moral  reasons),  where  this  means  regularly 
recognising such reasons, and at least sometimes acting upon them.47
2.4.1 Are implicit biases reasons-responsive?
This condition for responsibility most naturally points us towards consideration of the  manifestation of 
biases  in  action.  However,  it  is  worth  noting  that,  insofar  as  the  implicit  associations  are  culturally 
influenced (tracking to some extent cultural stereotypes) there is reason to suppose that the processes that 
lead to the presence of an implicit bias in an individuals’ cognitive structure are not wholly unresponsive to 
reason. Were there not a stereotype prevalent in the US that connects black males with guns, it is unlikely 
that an implicit association between ‘black male’ and ‘guns’ would show up in tests for weapons bias. This is 
not to say that  the processes by which biases are entrenched are fully rational;  any responsiveness to 
reasons is at best partial and limited. Indeed, being responsive to such stereotypes is being responsive to 
bad reasons. However, such a pattern of response might be sufficient for meeting reasons-responsiveness 
conditions: we hold people responsible for responding to bad reasons as much as for good ones.  It is also 
worth noting again Lowery et al’s (2001) suggestion that the more limited influence of biases when the 
subjects have contact with members of the stigmatised group indicates that such associations are sensitive 
to evidence – and thus might sometimes be responsive to good reasons also.
2.4.2 Are the processes that lead to the manifestation of bias reasons-responsive?
What of  the  processes  by  which bias  is  manifested in  action – do these processes  meet  the reasons-
responsive condition for responsibility? One might think that, insofar as the influence of implicit bias on 
action is  automatic,  and so outside of awareness,  and not under direct  control,  it  is  not responsive to 
reason.  So  even  if  these  two  conditions  (awareness,  direct  control)  are  not  themselves  necessary  for 
responsibility (as I have argued above), they may be relevant to whether an individual’s action producing 
processes are reasons-responsive.
However, it would be a mistake to suppose that actions which are produced by automatic processes in 
general are not responsive to reason. Consider the kind of automatic processes involved in the production 
of an excellent shot by an accomplished tennis player (cf. Arpaly, 2003, p.52). Such actions are clearly not 
the result of reflective deliberation on the reasons for action – and the shot would be worse were it so. 
Such automatic processes involved in the production of the excellent shot are highly responsive to reason – 
reason to move from the baseline and approach the ball, to play it with topspin and so on. So, that implicit 
biases function automatically does not itself entail that individuals are not responsible for being influenced 
by them in action.48
47  See Fischer & Ravizza (1999) for a full and much more detailed articulation of the view. See also Wolf, 1990. 
48  See also Snow N. (2009) Virtue as Social Intelligence: An Empirically Grounded Theory, Routledge.
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Moreover,  in  a  recent  overview of  empirical  findings  on  the  reliance  of  individuals  upon  stereotypes, 
Uhlmann et  al  attend  to  cases  in  which  the  influence  of  stereotypic  implicit  associations  on  action  is 
motivated by the need to enhance self-esteem or the motive to rationalise inequality.49 (Their claim is that 
the reliance on stereotypes is therefore epistemically irrational.) If this is the case, then the operation of 
bias – its influence on action – might well be understood as meeting the reasons-responsive condition. The 
production of action that manifests bias might involve processes that are sensitive to certain reasons (the 
need to  enhance self-esteem, say),  and at  least  sometimes responsive to  those reasons (by producing 
behaviours or judgements influenced by bias, which under-evaluate a black or female colleague, say, and so 
enhances self-esteem). Once again, these are bad reasons, and other reasons – such as reasons of accuracy, 
and respect, and fair attention to individual qualities – would demonstrate greater sensitivity to reasons. 
But  that  the  action  producing  processes  are  sensitive  to  bad reasons,  rather  than  good  ones,  is  not 
sufficient to exempt an agent from responsibility for those actions.
Finally,  one might  think  that being sensitive  to  these bad reasons is  not  sufficient  for  responsibility,  if 
individuals are not able, at least sometimes, to be responsive to better reasons (such as reasons of respect). 
But some of the considerations I have detailed above, pertaining to the kinds of control that individuals may 
have  over  the  manifestation  of  implicit  bias  –  long  range  control,  or  indirect  control  –  suggest  that 
individuals at least sometimes are able to manipulate the action producing processes so as to make them 
more responsive to such good reasons, by regulating or mitigating the effects of biases. 
These considerations suggest that premises 2a and 2b of the argument presented above are false;  the 
harbouring and manifestation of bias do not always fail to meet a reasons-responsive condition. Accepting a 
reasons-responsiveness condition for moral responsibility, then, does not entail  that individuals are not 
liable to blame for bias.
2.5 Summary
I have considered in some detail the arguments against holding individuals responsible either for harbouring 
biases, or for the manifestation of biases in action or behaviour. I have argued that the arguments from 
causal etiology, control, awareness and reasons-responsiveness cannot establish that individuals are not 
responsible for the influence of bias upon action. I argued that we should not accept these arguments – 
either because they rely on false empirical premises, or because they posit conditions for responsibility 
which are not necessary. So whilst (if we accept premise 1 of the argument from causal etiology) it might be 
inappropriate to regard individuals as responsible for  having  implicit biases, we cannot conclude that we 
ought not to regard individuals as liable for blame for being influenced by implicit bias.
This  does  not  show  that  individuals  are  liable  for  blame  for  the  manifestation  of  bias  in  action  and 
judgement – there may yet be other conditions for responsibility that I have not considered here, and that 
actions influenced by implicit bias do not meet. However, the considerations picked out by philosophers as 
most salient to responsibility in the context of implicit bias do not support the conclusion that individuals 
are never responsible for being influenced by bias. Moreover, the considerations I raised with respect to 
long range and indirect control over biases lays the foundations for a more detailed exploration of whether 
such conditions are sufficient for responsibility for the manifestation of implicit bias. 
I have thus addressed, in as much detail as is presently possible, the question of the truth of the claim that  
individuals are liable for blame for implicit bias. However, we might be left the following pressing question: 
49  Uhlmann, Brescoll, Machery, (2010) The Motives Underlying Stereotype-Based Discrimination Against Members of 
Stigmatized Groups, Social Justice Research 23:1-16.
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even if individuals are sometimes liable for blame for the manifestation of bias, how can we discern when 
this is the case? What use is it to maintain that people can be liable to blame for manifesting bias in their 
actions, if we are unable to ascertain when it would ever be appropriate to blame an individual for bias. The 
objection might continue: ‘You say that individuals may be responsible for the influence of bias where this is 
a function of their explicit beliefs and values – but that this is the case can only be detected, surely, in the 
kind of  laboratory conditions  in which empirical  psychologists  were able to draw out of  their  data the 
statistical analyses that support this claim. And we have no ready means of doing so in our daily interactions 
with others. So the claim that it is false that people are not responsible for bias, and the suggestion about 
the conditions under which they may be liable for blame for bias, are inert and cannot be incorporated into 
our practices of holding each other responsible’.
This worry is an important one, and in the next section, I address it, together with the practical concern 
raised by Saul; namely, that holding people responsible for their biases will not help to motivate individuals 
to try to alleviate the presence and influence of implicit  bias.  In doing so, I  hope to provide additional 
motivation for the claim that we could justifiably regard individuals as liable for blame for implicit bias, but 
also articulate further qualifications on when and whether it may be appropriate to do so.
3. The practice of holding responsible for implicit bias
The concern set out above asks whether it is at all useful to maintain that individuals are responsible for 
implicit  bias.  Saul presents a further challenge: rather than simply being unhelpful, it might actually be 
damaging to maintain that individuals are liable for blame for such biases:
What we need is an acknowledgement that we are all likely to be implicitly biased—only this 
can provide the motivation for what needs to be done.  If acknowledging that one is biased 
means declaring oneself to be one of those bad racist or sexist people, we cannot realistically 
expect the widespread acknowledgement that is required.  Instead, we’ll get defensiveness 
and hostility (p.22)
In this section, I address this worry, arguing that the focus on blaming is unduly narrow, and that a more 
comprehensive picture of our practices of holding responsible can show why this practical concern may be 
misguided. However, as the claims are about empirical matters, I make some proposals for future research, 
and elaborate on the different debates this research might fruitfully inform. 
3.1. Blaming and holding responsible
We have two questions here. First, what is the point of regarding people as liable for blame if we cannot 
identify  when they  might be blameworthy  for  implicitly  biased actions? Second,  do we only  have two 
options: deny that individuals are responsible, or maintain they are bad sexist and racist people? On this 
latter question, I think we should deny that these are the only two options. But Saul’s concern hones in on a 
tendency we might well worry about: that people may tend to suppose that claiming that individuals are 
implicitly  biased means that they are  being  accused of  being  racist  and sexist.  But if  maintaining that 
individuals are liable to blame for the manifestation of such bias does not entail that they are bad racist and 
sexist people, then it is important to try to combat this tendency. 
In order to mitigate any such tendencies, it will be important to resist any leaps from the claim that an 
individual harbours and is influenced by implicit bias to the claim that they are therefore racist or sexist. I 
think there are clear ways in which that leap can indeed be resisted. Compare the case of an individual who, 
despite being concerned to treat people fairly and respectfully, holds an explicitly sexist and racist belief 
(e.g. that women are not as good at philosophy as men, or that black men are more aggressive than white 
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men). Before leaping to the conclusion that she is a 'bad sexist or racist', we might say that she has gone 
wrong somewhere – she has a false belief, which, if she really does profess to care about treating people 
fairly and respectfully, she should revise. We can of course say that their beliefs are racist and sexist without 
thereby assuming that the person is racist or sexist, if by that we mean that the individual harbours ill will or 
hatred towards women and racial minorities (Garcia, 1996), or that the individual endorses a system of 
beliefs about the inferiority of one race or gender amounting to an ideology (Shelby, 2002).50 
Likewise with implicit biases: before concluding that an individual who is influenced by implicit bias is  sexist 
and racist, we might say that she has just gone wrong – some aspects of her cognitive and motivational 
structures are such that, if she really cares about treating people respectfully and fairly, she should work to 
get rid of or limit the influence of. Only where such false beliefs or negative implicit biases are maintained, 
rationalised and defended might we be more inclined to think that the individual involved really is sexist 
and racist. To suppose that an individual who has some racist belief or attitude or implicit bias is racist is to 
perform the kind of unhelpful 'categorical drift' that Blum warns against, arguing that when different failings 
(being  a  racist  person,  having  a  racist  attitude)  are  not  adequately  distinguished,  this  serves  only  to 
'diminish their usefulness and force as concepts expressing moral reproach' (2002, p.13). Rather, he argues, 
'in the interest of accuracy and of facilitating communication about these vexing matters, we would do well  
to recognise such complexity' (p.29). Further, we can deny that the individual is a sexist and racist person, 
without denying that she is liable for blame for her sexist and racist belief or implicit bias. 
It may still be that pointing out to individuals that they have false beliefs, or implicit biases, for which they 
are liable for blame, might sometimes lead them to suppose that they are being accused of being racist and 
sexist. But this is a reason to be careful about the way such claims are presented, rather than not to make 
such claims at all.
What about blame though? It is one thing to hold that, theoretically speaking, individuals can be justifiably 
held responsible and regarded as blameworthy for their implicit biases, and quite another thing to in fact 
blame them for being biased. This brings us to some of the issues raised by the first concern: that given our  
epistemic position with respect to whether and why individuals are influenced by implicit bias, we ought 
not to in fact blame one another for manifesting implicit bias. 
I  think  that  we  can agree with  these  remarks  about  the  difficulties  of  knowing when an  individual  is 
blameworthy  for  being  biased,  and  the  impropriety,  therefore,  of  in  fact  blaming  each  other,  whilst 
nonetheless maintaining that it is important to regard individuals as responsible (and so potentially liable to 
blame) for implicit bias.  To suppose that the only purpose of regarding each other as liable for blame is so 
that we are in a position to blame each other when required is to take an unduly narrow view on the point  
of our practices of responsibility.
Here are two aspects of our practices of regarding each other as responsible that are overlooked if we focus 
only on blaming and on identifying people as ‘bad’, and which show the importance of emphasising liability 
for blame even in the absence of clarity about when to apportion blame:
3.1.1 Holding ourselves responsible 
We might not feel warranted in actually blaming others for being influenced by implicit biases. But this does 
not mean that we are not able to blame ourselves for being influenced by such biases. As mentioned above, 
some evidence indicates that individuals are aware of the discrepancies between how they should act and 
how they would (given the influence of implicit biases) act. With this awareness, individuals are well placed 
50 J. L. A. Garcia (1996). The Heart of Racism. Journal of Social Philosophy 27 (1):5-46;Tommie Shelby (2002). Is Racism 
in the "Heart"? Journal of Social Philosophy 33 (3):411–420.
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to blame themselves for being influenced by bias, whilst it might be inappropriate for others to do so - 
perhaps because others do not or cannot know  the extent to which my biased behaviour results from my 
attitudes towards treating others non-prejudicially, or whether I have done enough to activate my goal of 
treating others non-prejudicially. 
There is some evidence which suggests that holding oneself responsible might be particularly effective a 
way to mitigate the effects of implicit bias. Amodio et al (2007) present evidence that suggests that guilt is a 
particularly useful affective response in regulating implicit  bias.51 And we have seen Mozkowitz and Li’s 
(2011) claims to the effect that focusing on one’s failures to live up to ideals can activate the goal of treating  
others  non-prejudicially,  thereby  inhibiting  bias  related  goals.  If  this  is  right,  then  holding  oneself 
responsible, and in particular feeling guilt when one fails to live up to one’s non-prejudicial ideals, could 
play an important role in responding to implicit biases. 
3.1.2 Shaping expectations and behaviour
Facts about whether or not a certain activity or behaviour is one for which individuals are held responsible 
and therefore are liable to blame, can alter norms and expectations about how individuals ought to behave, 
even if we rarely in fact identify individuals who are blameworthy for so acting. Classifying certain actions as 
prohibited,  for  which  individuals  are  liable  to  blame,  can  have  numerous  important  effects,  including: 
strengthening norms against so acting; encouraging individuals to self-monitor; leading us to change our 
expectations  of  the  steps  others  might  take in  monitoring  their  own behaviour.  These changes  are  all 
important corollaries of regarding some form of behaviour as something for which individuals are properly 
held responsible, and for which they are liable to blame. But note that they do not depend upon us being 
able to in fact engage in blaming, although some of them might encourage us to challenge others’ decisions 
and provide careful justification for them. 
Of course, these practices do not only follow from regarding a certain kind of behaviour as appropriately 
within the remit of responsible action; but insofar as they are bound up with our practices of  holding 
responsible, attending to these considerations helps us to see why it can be important to regard ourselves 
and others as responsible for being influenced by implicit bias, even if we think that we will rarely be in an 
epistemic position to in fact blame another for being influenced by implicit bias.
3.2 Further empirical work
I have in this final section tried to suggest that there might be ways of addressing the concerns about the 
practical efficacy of regarding individuals as liable for blame for being influenced by implicit bias. However, 
whether holding each other responsible, and blameworthy, for being influenced by bias is likely to have an 
effect  on the extent  to which individuals  in future  manifest  bias is  in  large  part  an empirical  matter.52 
Empirical investigation into the effects of whether individuals are more or less likely to display implicit bias, 
or more or less motivated to mitigate the influence of implicit bias, when told they are responsible for being 
influenced by such biases, could shed light on how best to structure our interactions with each other in 
addressing the influence of bias. One reason for which one might worry about the effects of holding each 
other responsible is that some empirical data indicates that individuals tend to respond badly to negative 
feedback  (Blair  et  al  2002,  pp.244-247).  However,  it  is  not  clear  that  blame  can  be  understood 
51   Amodio, Devine, and Harmon-Jones (2007) ‘A Dynamic Model of Guilt: Implications for Motivation and Self-
Regulation in the Context of Prejudice, Psychological Science, vol 18 (6).
52 Note also that whether treating each other as liable to blame inhibits the manifestation of bias is a separate 
question from whether doing so is efficacious in getting people to take steps in e.g. introducing policies to limit the 
possible influence of bias (anonymising reviews), or taking other practical steps. Saul reports (in conversation) that 
the strategy of emphasising non-responsibility has been important in bringing about change. We could agree with 
this whilst insisting that whether treating each other as responsible (or not) affects the manifestation of bias 
directly (rather than by bias-blocking policies) is an empirical question not yet answered.
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straightforwardly as a form of negative feedback. And the studies that support the hypothesis that guilt has 
an important role in inhibiting the influence of implicit bias (Amodio et al 2007) might lead us to suppose 
that blaming could have some constructive role in mitigating the influence of bias. Further empirical study 
might help us both in addressing our responses to bias, but additionally in helping us to consider whether 
and how blame differs from other forms of negative feedback. 
3.3 Implications for philosophical methodology: the heterogeneity of ‘implicit biases’
My discussion throughout has for the most part focused on negative implicit racial biases. Much of the 
experimental work I have considered has pointed to the ways in which the manifestation of these implicit 
biases is related to individuals' beliefs and values, might be something of which individuals can be aware, 
and can be seen to be, in a limited and defective way, reasons-responsive. Before concluding, it is worth 
noting that many of these findings about the effects of attitudes on implicit race biases do not seem to 
generalise to all  kinds of implicit  biases. Regarding the relationship between implicit biases and explicit 
values and beliefs in particular, Banaji & Hardin (1996) found no difference in the implicit biases regarding 
gender with respect to individuals who, on self-reports, measured high or low in sexist beliefs (p.139).53 One 
feature worth noting in relation to their study, however, is that the associations involved tested for speed of 
association between gendered primes (nurse, mechanic) and recognition of pronouns (he, she). It may be 
that individuals who measured low on sexism share these strong gender stereotypical associations because 
of their familiarity with, if not endorsement of, these stereotypes. Because they are not inherently negative 
or evaluative, we might not expect to see the same inhibitory mechanisms at work in low-sexism subjects as 
in the low-prejudice subjects in the race/negative association studies. 
This  raises  important  issues  about  the  extent  to  which  we  can  talk  about  ‘implicit  biases’  per  se,  as 
philosophers have tended to do. This term, rather, should be considered to cover a heterogeneous set of 
cognitive  associations,  including  negative  evaluative  or  affective  associations,  semantic  associations, 
negative  stereotypes,  and  neutral  stereotypes.  When  talking  about  implicit  biases,  and  when  making 
recommendations about how to alleviate or inhibit the influence of these associations on action, we ought 
to be alert to the particular kind of bias at issue, and be cautious in generalising from claims about the 
operation of other kinds of biases, which may not be regulated or manipulated in the same ways. 
4. Concluding remarks
I have argued that we should reject the arguments for the claim that individuals are not responsible for 
being  influenced  by  implicit  biases.  Individuals  might  sometimes  meet  sufficient  conditions  for 
responsibility,  when they  have long range control  and so can take responsibility  for  mitigating  implicit 
biases; or when they are blameworthy given the indirect influence, via reflective level beliefs and attitudes, 
over  whether  their  actions  manifest  implicit  bias.  In  considering  in  more  detail  the  relevant  empirical 
findings, we have been able to draw out some methodological implications for how philosophers might deal 
with  the  heterogeneity  of  'implicit  biases'.  Finally,  the  practical  considerations  taken  to  speak  against 
holding each other responsible take an unduly narrow view both on what it is to regard someone as liable 
for  blame,  and  on  the  nature  of  our  practices  of  holding  each  other,  and  ourselves,  responsible.  But 
discerning whether treating each other as responsible is or is not an effective means to mitigating implicit 
bias is something that could be tested in future empirical research.54
53  Banaji, M., & Hardin, C. (1996). Automatic stereotyping. Psychological Science, 7, 136-141.
54  This paper has greatly benefited from fruitful discussions and illuminating feedback from Jenny Saul, Komarine 
Romdehn-Romluc, Dan Kelly, Joseph Sweetman, Tom Stafford, Clea Rees, Jonathan Webber, Peter Kirwin, the 
editors of this volume and an anonymous reviewer for JSP.
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